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A Procedural Evaluation of an Analytic-Deliberative
Process: The Columbia River Comprehensive Impact
Assessment
Aimee Guglielmo Kinney1 and Thomas M. Leschine2*

The U.S. Department of Energy's Columbia River Comprehensive Impact Assessment
(CRCIA) was an ambitious attempt to direct its cleanup of the Hanford Nuclear
Reservation toward the most signi®cant risks to the Columbia River resulting from past
plutonium production. DOE's approach was uncommonly open, including tribal, regulatory
agency, and other Hanford interest group representatives on the board that was to develop
the assessment approach. The CRCIA process had attributes of the ``analytic-deliberative''
process for risk assessment recommended by the National Research Council. Nevertheless,
differences between the DOE and other participants over what was meant by the term
``comprehensive'' in the group's charge, coupled with differing perceptions of the likely
effectiveness of remediation efforts in reducing risks, were never resolved. The CRCIA
effort became increasingly fragmented and the role its products were to play in in¯uencing
future clean-up decisions increasingly ambiguous. A procedural evaluation of the CRCIA
process, based on Thomas Webler's procedural normative model of public participation,
reveals numerous instances in which theoretical-normative discourse disconnects occurred.
These had negative implications for both the basic procedural dimensions of Webler's
modelÐfairness and competence. Tribal and other interest group representatives lacked the
technical resources necessary to make or challenge what philosopher Jurgens Habermas
terms cognitive validity claims, while DOE and its contractors did not challenge normative
claims made by tribal representatives. The results are cautionary for implementation of
the analytic-deliberative process. They highlight the importance of bringing rigor to
the evaluation of the quality of the deliberation component of risk characterization via the
analytic-deliberative process, as well as to the analytic component.
KEY WORDS: Analytic-deliberative process; discourse analysis; Hanford Nuclear Site; nuclear
weapons complex cleanup; procedural-normative evaluation

1. INTRODUCTION
Conducting risk assessments for environmental
hazards in ways that embrace both scienti®c norms
and public values, including expectations regarding
public participation, remains an elusive goal. Although public participation provides numerous
bene®ts to agency decision making, involvement of
citizens does not necessarily reduce con¯ict or lead
to more widely accepted decisions. In some cases the
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participation procedures themselves can become a
new source of con¯ict.(1) Yet information regarding
procedural de®ciencies of past participatory experiences is not commonly identi®ed and disseminated.
Critical evaluations of citizen advisory boards generally emphasize outcome, while process variables
receive less attention.(2) This shortcoming has hampered effective learning and feedback for improving
participatory mechanisms. The case study developed
in this article demonstrates a process for procedural
evaluation of participatory risk assessments and
underscores the importance of incorporating attention to procedural questions into the design of such
assessments.
Notable among efforts to elaborate on how to
involve citizens and interest groups in the conduct of
risk assessments is the National Research Council's
proposal for an ``analytic-deliberative'' process.(3)
This proposal and, to an extent, earlier studies by
NRC committees, beginning with the ``red book'' on
risk assessment and management,(4) address a wide
range of issues relevant to the joint participation by
laypersons and experts in assessment and management of socially relevant risks.
Typically, however, such proposals come out of
committee processes dominated by risk assessment
practitioners whose personal experiences and understandings about ``what's wrong'' with the nation's
approach to risk assessment and management
strongly color the nature of the remedies proposed.(5) This atheoretical approach to design can
render the participatory models proposed dif®cult to
evaluate in broader social and political terms.(6)
Even if one were to craft experimentally an example
application of the NRC's analytic-deliberative approach, the analyst's conclusions about its workability in engaging stakeholders will likely depend
on the importance he or she attaches to the in¯uence
of any of a number of context-speci®c factors. To an
extent then, the twin problems of crafting and
evaluating approaches to increasing the quality of
participation in, or acceptance of, risk assessment
are embedded within the larger problem that
Jasanoff refers to as the ``two cultures'' of risk
assessment.
From Jasanoff's social perspective, risk assessment can come across as incomplete when inadequate attention is paid to problems of ``scale''
(spatial, temporal), ``interactivity'' (extent to which
risks are socially determined), and ``contingency''
(context dependency) in the construction of risk
scenarios.(5) The public's lack of trust in those who
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oversee risky technologies, coupled with risk managers' lack of understanding of the dynamics of the
processes by which public trust can be destroyed,
also contribute to the failure to ®nd acceptance of
many public risk management efforts.(7,8) Issues of
public trust seem especially to have hindered the
public's acceptance of nuclear technologies and
federal programs for the management of nuclear
wastes.(8,9) Still another perspective, one in¯uenced
by ``direct participation'' theories of democracy
formulated by political scientists, argues that
``effective participation is unlikely ¼ if large
resource inequalities exist among participants''
(p. 348).(10) This latter condition seemingly typi®es
the situation at the larger, more remote U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) sites where the great
bulk of the legacy wastes of the nuclear weapons
production era are now stored.(11,12)
Political scientists can bring more uni®ed theoretical perspectives to the problem of engaging the
public in technological decision making, but competing theoretical frameworks leave the analyst with
the normative question of which criteria are most
appropriate when evaluating instances of public
participation, or model frameworks by which it
might be effected.(13,14) The latter two authors
evaluate in general terms the strengths and weaknesses of commonly employed models for involving
members of the public or public interest groups in
technological decision making. In our experience,
however, and in part for reasons noted above, the
public processes developed to engage stakeholders
in public risk debates are likely to be hybrids
dif®cult to classify in terms of standard models of
participation.
This dilemma is largely avoided if we take the
path advocated by Thomas Webler and shift our
focus instead to the micro level where, ``by and
large, participation is interaction among individuals
through the medium of language (emphasis in
original, p. 40).(15) Webler argues that macro-level
theories of democracy do not address the question of
which modes of public participation lead to better
understanding. We believe that Webler's approach,
which is based on theories of the use of language
(i.e., pragmatics, as embodied in the work of
Habermas(16,17)), can provide useful insights at the
level where the importance of characteristics of risk
debates like those pointed to by Jasanoff, Slovic,(5,8)
and others can be assessed.
In this article we utilize Webler's framework for
evaluating participation from a procedural
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perspective to examine a recent participatory risk
assessment conducted under the aegis of the DOE.
Our focus is an ambitious attempt by the DOE's
Richland Field Of®ce (DOE-RL) to engage Indian
tribes, regulators, and other members of the eastern
Washington stakeholder community in a comprehensive assessment of the risks posed by contaminants released at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation
to the resources of the Columbia River (the
Columbia River Comprehensive Impact Assessment, known as the CRCIA). Because the CRCIA
was in general terms structured along lines similar to
those of the analytic-deliberative process advocated
by the National Research Council, our assessment
also provides a basis for comment on the implementation of that approach in social and political
contexts like that framing the Hanford cleanup.
Our approach is to employ procedural criteria
developed by Webler(15) to evaluate the quality of
the deliberation that occurred among DOE-RL and
its contractors and representatives of Hanford
region Indian tribes, the Hanford Advisory Board
(HAB), and federal and state regulatory agencies
(U.S. EPA and the Washington Department of
Ecology). From this perspective, language becomes
the basic currency of exchange in communal,
problem-solving efforts. This approach highlights
the nature of the discourse that occurs among
participants over time and permits evaluation of
that discourse in terms of implications for two basic
procedural dimensionsÐfairness and competence.
Webler's framework thus makes it possible to
examine procedural breakdowns for their origins in
the discourse that led to them and to trace their
ripples outward to the results the participants
ultimately achieve.
The parties to the CRCIA encountered numerous process dif®culties and, in the end, achieved
uncertain results. This underscores not only the
importance of fair and competent deliberative process, but also the dif®culty of overcoming the
in¯uence of broader, context-speci®c factors on
deliberations like the CRCIA. Inherent inequalities
in power, a long history of mistrust, and basic
differences in the ways parties perceived a range of
attributes of the risks whose impacts were to be
evaluated, falling generally into the ``scale,'' ``interactivity,'' and ``contingency'' categories discussed by
Jasanoff,(5) taken together, appear to explain the
outcome of the CRCIA effort.
In spite of the ``failure'' of the CRCIA as
originally construed, it nevertheless lives on at
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Hanford, having seemingly transmuted into a newer
DOE initiative, the ``Hanford Groundwater/Vadose
Zone Integration Project,'' an intended broad-based
assessment of the implications for site cleanup of the
recent discovery that vadose zone and groundwater
contamination at Hanford is much more extensive
than previously thought.3 This suggests that focusing
exclusively on a single participatory risk assessment
effort via micro-level analysis runs the risk that one
is unable to account for the in¯uence of broader
external social and political in¯uences on the results
obtained. To what extent has a particular participatory process failed if it lives on in a variety of
different guises? Consideration of the broader context of the CRCIA, the subject of the last section of
this article, leads us to conclude that macro-level
analysis of the type proposed by Laird is a necessary
adjunct to micro-level analysis. Discourse analysis
by itself cannot help us gauge the in¯uence of
diverse political factors on the outcomes observed,
and in fact is largely silent on the question of judging
outcomes. Nevertheless, discourse analysis has great
value in pointing toward the types of circumstantial
in¯uences for which we should look, as we believe
this study demonstrates.
2. HANFORD AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER
Between 1945 and 1987, plutonium was produced at the 560-square-mile Hanford Nuclear
Reservation in southeastern Washington. Hanford
was chosen as the wartime Manhattan Project's site
for plutonium production not only for its remote
location, but also for its proximity to the Columbia
River, which ¯ows through the site's northern
portion and forms part of its eastern boundary. As
the second largest river in the United States, the
Columbia offered an abundant supply of cooling
water for the production reactors. Hanford was the
®rst production facility in the United States, and one
of only three sites within the nuclear complex with
chemical separations capabilities. This component of
the fuel cycle, in which spent nuclear fuel and targets
were dissolved to isolate and concentrate plutonium,
generated large volumes of high-level radioactive
wastes. Fifty-®ve million gallons of these processing
wastes are now stored in 177 underground storage

3

Information on the CRCIA and its relationship to the Hanford
Groundwater/Vadose Zone Integration Project can be viewed at
http://www.hanford.gov/crcia/crcia.htm (October 23, 2000).
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tanks, at least 67 of which have leaked wastes into
the surrounding soil.
These leaks contribute to extensive contaminant
plumes in the subsurface, mostly the products of
waste processing and tank farm operations. The
radionuclides tritium, uranium, iodine-129, strontium-90, and technetium-99 are intermingled with
numerous plumes of nonradioactive contaminants,
including toxic heavy metals and organic compounds. Although estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty, hundreds of billions of gallons of
radioactively contaminated wastewater were discharged into unlined pits and trenches or directly
to the ground during the Hanford Site's operational
period.
A total of 1.4 million curies of radioactivity are
now estimated to be present in soils and groundwater at Hanford.(18) Despite most operations having
taken place on the Hanford Reservation's central
plateau, far from the Columbia, at least one
contaminant plume originated there, tritium, is
now known to be impinging on the river. Hanford's
groundwater thus provides a major pathway for
contaminants to reach the Columbia.
The nine plutonium production reactors located
near the Columbia utilized once-through cooling
systems coupled to unlined settling ponds. The result
is a substantial legacy of contamination of soils and
groundwater in the vicinity of the reactors, and hence
very near to the river itself. Strontium-90 and
chromium (used to prevent corrosion) are particularly problematic, as both now appear in springs
and seeps along the river, in deep-rooted herbaceous
plants growing along the banks, and in salmon
spawning areas within the river bed itself.(19,20) When
the N-Reactor was suddenly shut down in the mid1980s, never to be restarted, uranium fuel elements
were orphaned in adjacent water-®lled concrete
holding basins. Now held in water whose level
requires constant monitoring, these fuel rods are
decaying into a highly radioactive sludge, posing
perhaps the most imminent safety hazard among the
many environmental problems that are the Hanford
legacy.
Hanford's DOE managers, like their predecessors in the Atomic Energy Commission, and before
that, the Manhattan Project, have generally relied
on technocratic approaches to decision making.
Such approaches have the potential to con¯ict with
democratic ideals. Gerber(21) describes the war years
as a time when the ``series of checks and balances
that normally guard the American government
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against excesses was ¼ virtually inoperative.'' Subjugation of democratic process continued throughout the early 1950s, when the nuclear weapons
production network expanded its capacities nationwide. Not until the Cold War ended and the mission
of most nuclear complex sites shifted to cleanup did
DOE begin to actively engage citizen stakeholders
in its remediation efforts. In addition to the more
traditional review-and-comment mode of public
participation, DOE has begun to use citizen advisory
boards as a means of incorporating public input into
the administrative decision-making process.
Citizen advisory boards, which DOE calls SiteSpeci®c Advisory Boards (SSABs), have been created for sites throughout the nuclear weapons
complex. SSAB members are expected to provide
advice on key clean-up decisions to decisionmakers.
DOE of®cials must in turn de®ne and clearly
communicate their decision-making process to the
Board. They must inform Board members of actions
resulting from recommendations; if recommendations are not accepted, an explanation must be
given. Representatives from state, tribal, and local
governments, and the EPA are also encouraged to
attend and participate.4
Three federally recognized tribes, the Nez Perce
Tribe (NPT), Yakima Indian Nation (YIN), and
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR), have special rights and interests in
the land currently occupied by Hanford facilities and
the ®shery resources potentially affected by its
contaminants. Indigenous peoples have lived in the
Columbia Basin since time immemorial. In 1855, a
number of treaties were signed between the United
States and several northwest tribes. Native Americans ceded title to area lands in return for protected
access to resources within and outside reservation
boundaries, and acknowledgment of tribal sovereignty. Today, tribal peoples routinely access portions of the Hanford Site to gather foods and
medicines important for traditional religious practices, and co-manage the Site's cultural resources.
However, tribal representatives have been desirous
of seeing an expansion of their role in DOE's
decision making on the Hanford cleanup.
The Columbia River is a drinking water source
for the Tri-Cities, which are located directly downstream from Hanford, and is used extensively for
4

See Boiko et al.(11) for a more detailed description of DOE's
SSABs, and an analysis of the establishment of the Hanford
Advisory Board.
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crop irrigation. The Hanford Reach, that portion of
the Columbia between the Priest Rapids and
McNary Dams where Hanford's nine plutonium
production reactors are located, is also used for a
variety of recreational activities. The river and its
resources, particularly salmon, are central to tribal
cultures. The Hanford Reach is an important
spawning area for Chinook salmon, several stocks
of which have recently been listed as ``threatened''
under the Endangered Species Act.
Thus many resources, uses, and claims are
established for the Hanford Reservation and the
adjacent Columbia River, despite site cleanup having barely begun. These are juxtaposed against the
problems posed by the continuing presence of a
variety of contaminants and hazards. It is in this
context that the CRCIA emerged. Its original
purpose was to establish a screening-level estimate
of the risk that Hanford-derived contaminants pose
in the aggregate to the Columbia River and its
resources, as a guide to remedial action under
CERCLA, the federal ``Superfund'' law.
2.1. The Columbia River Comprehensive Impact
Assessment
Of all the concerns the Northwest's citizens
have regarding the Hanford Site and its cleanup,
perhaps none is more important than the possibility
that Hanford's contaminants could negatively affect
the Columbia River. This concern served as an
impetus for a Tri-Party Agreement (TPA)-initiated
study to determine the degree to which Hanford
contaminants impact the river.5 The Columbia River
Comprehensive Impact Assessment, or CRCIA, was
not a typical technical analysis, however. Tribal and
stakeholder representatives had seats on the CRCIA
Project Management Team and, in the parlance of
NRC's analytic-deliberative process,(3) participated
as ``equally valid contributors.'' Unfortunately, by
the end of the CRCIA's initial phase, DOE had

5

The Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) is a federal facility consent
order designed to bring the Hanford Site into compliance with
environmental laws. Signed in 1989 by the DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Washington State Department of Ecology, the TPA contains dates, or milestones, by
which certain clean-up activities must be complete. The TPA
also established a division of authority for clean-up tasks: DOE
is the lead agency, which means it has the primary responsibility
for coordinating clean-up efforts, while EPA and Ecology serve
as regulators with enforcement powers.
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withdrawn from the process and essentially rejected
much of the representatives' work.
The CRCIA assessment was unlike many regulatorily driven technical processes, where stakeholder involvement consists of public review and
comment periods. Early on DOE-RL invited EPA
and the Washington Department of Ecology (Ecology) project managers to attend internal DOE-RL
project meetings. Instead of forming a separate
advisory board for tribal participation, DOE-RL
then invited representatives from the principal tribal
organizations in the region to become members of
the CRCIA Project Management Team. When the
Oregon State Department of Energy (Oregon) and
the Hanford Advisory Board (HAB) expressed
interest in the project, they too were invited to
participate.
The CRCIA was initially designed to enable
regulators to determine how much the river has been
impacted by Hanford's operations, and what types
of CERCLA remedial actions could minimize the
resulting risks. Although considerable data exists on
Hanford releases to the Columbia, this information
had never been tied together in one assessment. The
CRCIA was conceived to do just that. The word
``comprehensive'' was in the TPA milestone language; however, its interpretation created some
consequential differences in project participants'
expectations for the ®nal project. DOE's original
intent was to use existing data to assess the risk
posed by current conditions. Non-DOE representatives on the CRCIA Project Management Team had
a very different notion of what an assessment called
``comprehensive'' would look like, but acknowledged that time and budget constraints limited the
scope of the effort. The Team eventually agreed to
produce a scoping-level assessment to determine if
interim remedial actions were necessary (what
would become CRCIA Part I), and to write a
chapter for the ®nal report that de®nes what
additional work needs to be done to produce a truly
comprehensive assessment (what would become
CRCIA Part II).
Soon thereafter, this comprehensive ``chapter''
took on a life of its own and ended up becoming a
separate document. Whenever an idea was deemed
too ambitious for the screening assessment, it was
relegated to Part II. In effect, this partitioning
exacerbated the existing schism in the Project
Management Team: DOE-RL and its contractors
were able to take control of the Part I assessment,
while the tribal representatives simultaneously
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drove Part II. This complicated the already ambiguous Project Management Team structure and
blocked Teamwide consensus.
DOE-RL's goals for the CRCIA Project Management Team were never made explicit; hence the
parties appeared to have differing expectations
regarding their in¯uence, and legal decision-making
authority became an issue throughout the negotiations. The Team was a hybrid participatory mechanism, as it displayed characteristics of both a citizen
advisory board and a regulatory negotiation. It
began as a mechanism for government-to-government consultation (in seeming acknowledgement of
the tribes' status as self-governing entities), but then
appeared to become more of a consensus-driven
process.
The Team was not chartered under FACA (the
Federal Advisory Committees Act), as both citizen
advisory boards and regulatory negotiation committees are required to be. Regulatory negotiation
generally brings together representatives of different
interests in an effort to negotiate the content and
language of regulations. A participating agency is a
party to the negotiations, and thus explicitly shares
decision authority with the other representatives. An
agency convening a citizen advisory board, on the
other hand, does not participate in board debates and
thus the board's recommendations are nonbinding.
Unlike government-to-government consultation processes, both have an objective of consensus. However,
the consensus reached through a regulatory negotiation process must be consistent with the agency's
statutory authority. The evolution of the CRCIA
Team confused its decision authorityÐWas DOE in
charge, or would decisions the Team made as a whole
be implemented? Even in the Team's ®nal documents, the message is mixed (see note 6).
At the weekly Management Team meetings,
tribal and stakeholder participants were generally
outnumbered by technical contractor representatives (Table I). Communication did not ¯ow in just
one direction from these contractors to the tribes
and stakeholders, however. The meetings were
structured in a manner that allowed tribal, community, and regulator representatives to communicate
directly with the contractors conducting the screening assessment. In some respects, meetings shared
characteristics with the convergence model described by Bradbury.(22) Morning sessions of the
meetings tended to focus on the comprehensiveness
issue, while the scoping assessment was discussed in
the afternoons. Some attendees were present at one
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Table I. CRCIA Project Management Team Meeting
Participation

DOE
DOE contractors
EPA
Ecology
Oregon
YIN
NPT
CTUIR
HAB

Total number
of attendees at
all meetings

Average
representation
per meeting

48
158
18
47
17
30
27
24
16

2
6.6
0.75
2
0.71
1.25
1.13
1
0.67

Data from 24 representative meetings from 8/29/95 through
7/2/96. An average of 16 participants attended each meeting.

session or the other but not both; this is especially
true of technical contractors, many of whom attended only afternoon meetings.
Although DOE-RL was required by the TPA to
publish Part II, it never endorsed or approved the
opinions, conclusions, or recommendations espoused therein.6 Following completion in mid-1997
of the TPA Milestone that gave rise to the CRCIA,
DOE attempted to split the CRCIA Project Management Team into separate HAB-based and tribal
components and to narrow the scope of the followup studies to be conducted. This move was strongly
opposed by the HAB, the participating agencies, and
the tribes, all of whom expressed fears that the
integrative approach the CRCIA had fostered was
now being abandoned. DOE relented, and though
the CRCIA Management Team in theory exists
today as it did during the writing of the CRCIA
documents, its role in furthering integrative approaches to site cleanup is unclear.

6

The Part II CRCIA document includes a disclaimer that states,
``Publication ¼ is being performed as a public service ¼ [and]
does not constitute endorsement of the opinions, conclusions, or
recommendations contained therein by the U.S. DOE. ¼ For
Part II, the role of the U.S. DOE was not to negotiate its position
with respect to the individual requirements as they were being
discussed, but to host meetings and participate in a nonnegotiating role in the development of the requirements as a
total package ¼ Thus, the term `CRCIA Team' as used in Part II
refers to the team members described in `Requirements for a
Columbia River Comprehensive Impact Assessment', with DOE
playing a hosting and non-negotiating role.''(24)
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2.2. CRCIA Part I: Screening Assessment
The purpose of the CRCIA Part I screening
assessment was to ``identify areas where the greatest
potential exists for adverse effects on humans or the
environment.''(23) It was a scoping-level assessment,
which was to be used to indicate whether the issues
being studied were serious enough to warrant
further investigation or remedial action. The assessment was conducted by a DOE contractor, in
consultation with the CRCIA Project Management
Team.
Part I focused on 28 contaminants selected from
a set of 100 potential contaminants. These contaminants of interest were chosen using a multistage
screening process designed to identify the dominant
contributors to environmental or human health
risks. In a similar manner, the species of interest
set was narrowed to 52 species, from the 368 species
known to exist in the study area, by applying criteria
constructed to provide balance across taxonomic
groups and exposure pathways. Limiting the geographic and temporal scopes also served to constrain
the assessment's complexity.
Twelve human exposure scenarios were used in
the Part I assessment to demonstrate the potential
range of risks associated with various activities.
Included were a few slightly modi®ed standard EPA
scenarios and some developed speci®cally for the
CRCIA. The most important of this second category
were ®ve Native American scenarios developed by
the CTUIR representative. These scenarios are perhaps the only signi®cant nonagency Project Team
member contribution to Part I. The Subsistence
Resident, Upland Hunter, River-Focused Hunter/
Fisher, and Columbia River Island User scenarios
were speci®cally developed for Columbia Basin
climatic conditions, ecosystems, and indigenous
activity patterns.7
The results of the Part I assessment identi®ed
contaminants that posed a signi®cant potential risk,
ecological receptors most likely to be exposed to
elevated levels of contaminants, media where contaminants concentrated, pathways by which contaminants reached receptors, the location of
contaminant hot spots, and types of activities that
could result in adverse exposure to contaminants.

7

For information on the development of these scenarios, see
Harris and Harper(25) and Harper.(26)
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2.3. CRCIA Part II: Participant Requirements
for a ``Comprehensive'' Impact Assessment
The CRCIA Part II is a compilation of prescriptions for what would constitute a truly comprehensive
assessment in the eyes of its authorsÐnamely, tribal,
stakeholder, and regulatory agency representatives.
The objective was to design such an assessment, but
not to conduct it. That the task was seen by its authors
(a group that did not include DOE representatives,
see note 6) as one of developing a fundamentally new
approach to evaluating Hanford impacts is clear from
the self-described purpose of Part II. Part II was
characterized by its authors as ``de®n[ing] a new
paradigm for predecisional participation by those
affected by Hanford Cleanup decisions.''(24) The type
of predecisional participation the authors speak of is
an oversight role in the day-to-day work of conducting
risk assessments. Were their ideas to be implemented
by the DOE, the management of assessment work
would be carried out by a board composed of
representatives from the socioeconomic groups who
are affected by Hanford's clean-up and disposal
decisions. This citizen management board, called
the CRCIA Board, was envisioned to eliminate the
need to make ``arbitrary assumptions'' during the
course of an assessment, as CRCIA Board approval
would be required before any assumptions were
incorporated into an analysis. In addition, the CRCIA
Board would develop its own standards for data
quality and maintain ®nal authority over decisions
relating to assessment protocols.
The framework presented in Part II broadened
the fundamental concepts of receptor and impact
along with the spatial and temporal aspects of the
Part I assessment (Table II). Analysts were encouraged to focus on potential future impacts to the
Columbia in addition to current impacts. Any
``intrinsically hazardous'' substance should be treated as a potential risk and considered in an assessment. The receptor set should include humans,
plants, animals, as well as community groups, the
culture of the affected populations, and economic
viability of commercial groups. Part II's authors
expanded human health impacts far beyond carcinogenesisÐmutagenic, teratogenic, developmental,
neurological, immunological, and metabolic effects
should also be assessedÐand stressed the importance of societal impacts, such as economic and
quality-of-life effects.
Much of the focus of Part II was on improving
procedural or methodological aspects of DOE's risk
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Table II. A Comparison of the Scopes of CRCIA Part I and Part II

Time Frame
Geographic Extent
Contaminants

Part I

Part II

January 1990 through June 1996
Priest Rapids Dam to McNary Dam;
includes groundwater 0.5 mile in from
the river, and the adjacent riparian zone
12 radionuclides
2 carcinogenic chemicals
13 toxic chemicals

1943 until contaminants are no longer harmful
Priest Rapids Dam to the river's mouth in Astoria, OR; includes
groundwater found in seeps and springs in the riparian zone,
as well as groundwater upwellings in the river bottom
All contaminants released into the environment, including
radioactive decay daughter products and chemical compounds
expected to occur with time and after reaction with soils, river
chemistry, and other chemicals*
River-dependent humans, plants, animals, and community
groups; the culture of affected populations; the economic
viability of commercial groups
Human health effects: acute, chronic, mutagenic, teratogenic,
developmental, neurological, immunological, metabolic
Environmental effects: direct mortality; damage to ecosystem
robustness, resiliency, viability, and sustainability
Other effects: quality of life, cultural, usability of resources,
economic*

Receptors

Humans and 52 other species of aquatic,
riparian, and terrestrial biota

Impacts

Toxic and carcinogenic human health
effects; chronic and acute injury to
individual species

* This listing is the candidate set. Once narrowed through sensitivity and parametric analyses, which sort dominating factors from smaller
contributors to the total impact, it would become the study set.

analyses. For example, it was important to the
authors that substitution of expert judgment for
analytical quanti®cation be avoided unless credibility and reproducibility could be preserved. Sensitivity or parametric analyses, as opposed to expert
judgment, should be used to identify and rank
factors that dominate the outcome of the assessment. Again, CRCIA Board approval would be
required before any assumptions would be implemented. There was also a great deal of attention to
data quality. Assessment results should have the
accuracy, temporal/spatial resolution, and statistical
signi®cance to distinguish among clean-up and
disposal alternatives. It was also important to the
authors that analysts not dismiss effects simply
because ``popular analytical approaches'' cannot
assess them. Nor should elevated levels of contaminants be discarded from an assessment because they
lie below regulatory standards or have not been
linked to adverse effects at low concentrations.
Results of a CRCIA assessment would be dose
levels of each dominant contaminant to all receptors, as they vary with time throughout the period of
interest, and resultant impacts caused by both
individual and multiple contaminants (i.e., additive
or synergistic effects). For each of the DOE's visions
of a postcleanup end state, there should be a
corresponding CRCIA assessment of resultant
impacts. While the authors recognized that several
important CRCIA objectives lay beyond conven-

tional analytical practices, they still felt all impactsÐeven those generally considered in a
qualitative mannerÐshould be considered quantitatively.
Users of the CRCIA assessments would include
not only federal and state agencies, but community
groups as well. These assessments were designed to
guide decisions made by those affected by remediation choices in response to forecasted site conditions. While the authors saw the CRCIA primarily
as a tool to estimate the effectiveness of remediation
alternatives, CRCIA assessments could also be
integrated with other Hanford Site activities, such
as strategic planning, environmental impact statements, and budget planning.
Since the publication of the Scoping Assessment and Requirements for a Comprehensive
Assessment documents, what, if any, continuing
role the CRCIA Project Management Team has is
unclear. There has not been any further TPA
action regarding the CRCIA. The ambitious assessment agenda developed under Part II is
moving forward, but under the Site's ``Hanford
Groundwater/Vadose Zone Integration Project.''
The signi®cance of this programmatic shift is that
the follow-up activities are now run through DOERL's site contractor, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., with
the outside organizations whose representatives
made up the CRCIA Management Team relegated
once more to their pre-CRCIA rolesÐreview,
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comment, and advice.8 This result is, we believe,
symptomatic of shortcomings in the procedural
orientation of the DOE's participation mechanisms. On the one hand, the CRCIA process was
allowed to evolve in accordance with stakeholder
wishes; on the other hand, the results this process
produced proved less and less likely to be acceptable to the DOE as the agreed-to process unfolded.
These shortcomings are further examined by
means of Webler's procedural criteria in the next
section.
3. A PROCEDURAL EVALUATION OF THE
CRCIA CASE
As noted in Section 1, Webler's(15) procedural
normative model of public participation, based as it
is on Habermas's theories of how language is used,
aims to account for crucial ``micro level'' elements
of participation that are easily overlooked when
models are based in democratic theory alone. The
evaluation criteria he derives thus get to the heart of
important procedural issues at an individual, as
opposed to a societal, level.
Webler views participation as a highly specialized
form of interaction among individuals, so his focus is
on the discourse among those actors. This perspective
is unusual, if not unique, in the political arena. In the
CRCIA case, it is apparent that multiple discourses
were in use among members of the Project Management Team, their differing interpretations of the word
``comprehensive'' being a prime example. Webler's
model provides a way to look at the power of such
linguistic differences in shaping the outcome of a
participatory process. The goal of this evaluation of
the CRCIA case is to determine if the procedural
orientation of the approach the DOE used to involve
citizens was fair and competent, as de®ned by Webler.
We believe that these ``metacriteria'' of Webler's
framework encompass the two components of the
dilemma that the NRC's analytic-deliberative process(3) was meant to resolve: designing procedural
mechanisms for getting meaningful participation on
8

The ``Hanford Groundwater/Vadose Zone Integration Project,''
website (http://www.bhi-erc.com/vadose/vados.htm) states, ``RL
and a team of contractors led by Bechtel Hanford Inc., is
currently developing an integrated site-wide plan to characterize
the Hanford Site vadose zone and groundwater, and to assess all
relevant site programs and plans, with the primary objective of
protecting the Columbia River. Involving the Tribal Nations,
Stakeholders, and regulators are [sic] an integral part of this
project plan'' (November 13, 2000).
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the one hand, and then striking an appropriate
balance between technically sound analysis and
democratic ideals on the other.
3.1. Webler's Procedural Normative Model of
Public Participation
There are three major components of Webler's
model: the fairness and competence metacriteria,
Habermas's types of discourse, and Habermas's
rules for discourse.(16,17) The ®rst elements of the
model, the metacriteria, were derived from the
literature on what public participation should
accomplish and how it should do so. Fairness in
discourse occurs when all participants take part on
an equal footing. Everyone has equal opportunity to
determine the agenda and the rules for discourse, to
speak and raise questions, and to access knowledge
and interpretations. Competence refers to a participant articulating and protecting his or her interests,
while at the same time being able to contribute to
the de®nition of the collective will. Necessary are
not only competent understandings of terms, concepts, and de®nitions describing physical, social, and
personal conditions, but also the ability to come to
shared social constructions of reality. Competence
thus relates to the adequacy of knowledge selection
tools in use. It is a characteristic of the discourseÐcentered on the rules that coordinate interactionÐand not a characteristic of individuals. Thus,
a lack of discourse competence does not imply that
participants are incompetent. Competence is accomplished through the use, by the entire group, of
rational, established procedures for knowledge
selection.
Next, Webler incorporates elements of
Habermas's theory of communicative action, which
describes what people do in a discourse. Habermas
contends that each speech act makes an appeal
implicit in the statement that makes the message
meaningful, what he calls a validity claim. Different
types of speech acts make different types of validity
claims (Table III). Each requires a different means
by which discourse participants collectively decide
whether or not a speaker's assertion is valid, a
process called redemption. Understanding requires
participants to detect what it is about a statement
that gives it validity; agreement results when participants then choose the statements that are best or
most desirable.
For example, an explicative discourse might
involve what the term ``high-level'' means when
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Table III. Elements of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action

Speech act

Validity claim

Discourse

Communicative
Constantive or cognitive

Comprehensibility
True/correct

Explicative
Theoretical

Regulative
Representative or expressive

Normatively right
Truthful/sincere

Practical (normative)
Therapeutic

applied to radioactive waste. During a competent
explicative discourse, all terms, de®nitions, and
concepts are made explicit. If there is confusion,
comprehensibility issues are resolved by referencing
some type of commonly-agreed-upon standard, such
as a dictionary, regulatory, or textbook de®nition.
Con®rmation that all participants understand what
the term means would then be made.
Theoretical discourse involves disputes about
facts, which can be gathered through scienti®c
methodologies or daily life experiences. An example relevant to Hanford is discussion regarding
wastes detected in the groundwater below the 200
Area. There are two possible sources for such
wastes: deliberate discharges of wastes into unlined
trenches during the production years, or leaking
storage tanks. For participants collectively to
determine which discharge is the most likely
source, it is necessary to examine physical evidence
such as borehole samples and historical records of
chemical constituents present in tank versus trench
wastes. The participants must choose between these
con¯icting validity claims by deciding which provides the better description of reality. While one
does not have to be a scientist to participate in such
a theoretical discourse, someone who wants to
challenge an expert's calculations should base his
or her arguments in accordance with scienti®c
protocol. Likewise, discourse participants are obligated to recognize the validity of knowledge that
meets objective standards (e.g., peer review or
repeatability of experiments). Habermas and Webler do grant legitimacy to alternative forms of
knowledge, such as anecdotal observations, idiosyncratic observations about local conditions, and
traditional knowledge, but call for these knowledge
forms to be peer reviewed and/or independently
veri®ed as well.
Practical discourse, which to avoid confusion we
depart from Habermas and call normative discourse,
is discussion about social values and norms. The
representation of a variety of viewpoints is crucial

Example
High-level waste is stored at Hanford.
Waste from leaking tanks has reached groundwater
below the tank farms.
We should base clean-up decisions on risk, not cost.
I am concerned that radioactive contamination
from Hanford will give me cancer.

from both fairness and competence perspectives.
For example, proponents of both risk-based and
cost-ef®cient remediation strategies should be present during discussions regarding clean-up priorities.
Unlike theoretical and explicative discourse, however, there are no formalized rules or preestablished
standards for selecting among competing normative
validity claims.
Therapeutic discourse gives a speaker the opportunity to be introspective and to explore the
authenticity and subjectivity of his or her beliefs and
desires. A shift to theoretical discourse sometimes
occurs when expressive claims are ``translated.''
Translation is the challenge of cognitive claims
implicit in an expressive validity claim, which leads
the discussion to become a theoretical one. For
example, a participant is fearful that environmental
radiation will cause his dog to grow a third eye.
Since this speci®c fear has no basis in scienti®c fact, a
competent discourse would uncover the established
effects of radioactivity on mammals to assuage
irrational fears. Translation, however, is not the sole
purpose of therapeutic discourse.
The ®nal component of Webler's model is based
on Habermas's ``ideal speech situation,'' which can
be thought of as his ``rules for discourse.'' When
participants meet these requisite conditions, rationally motivated (as opposed to coerced) understanding and/or agreements can emerge from a discourse.
Webler modi®ed Habermas's rules to create separate requirements for fairness and competence in
discourse. It is important to note that the ideal
speech situation is a theoretical conception;
Habermas never expected all its conditions to be
met during real-world discussions.
3.2. Webler's Discursive Standard Criteria
Based on these three elements, Webler built a set
of criteria for evaluating how well participation
mechanisms compare to his normative model. This
evaluation framework consists of two additional
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classes of criteria. First, there are 13 subcriteria in two
categoriesÐactivities and needs (Tables IV and V).
The subcriteria are structured so that all needs must
be met for each activity. Then there are 34 evaluation
criteria, each with question sets for determining a
participatory mechanism's performance against that
criterion. Each evaluation criterion corresponds to a
combination of an activities subcriterion and a needs
subcriterion. The question sets, with 85 questions in
all, probe procedural elements of a participation
mechanism in a way that allows for a systematic
qualitative assessment.9
3.3. Methods
Using Webler's criteria, the CRCIA case was
evaluated to determine if the procedural orientation
of the approach the DOE used to involve citizens
was ``fair'' and ``competent.'' The evaluation was
based on information gleaned from review of Project
Management Team meeting minutes,10 and telephone interviews with three of the participants. The
time frame considered began when the Project
Management Team was formed, August 1995, and
ended with the DOE's of®cial comment on the
publication of the draft Scoping Assessment and
Requirements for a Comprehensive Assessment
documents, July 1997.

Table IV. Webler's Subcriteria for the Fairness Metacriterion
Activities
Agenda and rule making
Moderation and rule
enforcement
Discussion

9

Needs
All participants are free to be a
participant in the discourse (attend)
All participants are free to make
speech acts (initiate)
All participants are free to challenge
and defend claims (discuss)
All participants are free to in¯uence
the collective consensus (decide)

The question sets and additional details of this method can be
examined in either the Appendix of Webler(15) or Appendix A of
Guglielmo.(27) The latter is available on the Web at <http://
www.sma.washington.edu/people/students/thesis/guglielmo/
Index.html>.

10

Ideally, audiotapes or precise auditive transcripts should have
been reviewed to do full justice to the discourse analysis
concept. However, we reviewed only written summaries of the
Project Management Team meetings, as these were the only
records available.
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Table V. Webler's Subcriteria for the Competence Metacriterion
Activities

Needs

Explicative discourse All participants have access to information
and its interpretations (i.e., knowledge)
Theoretical discourse The best available procedures for
knowledge selection are used
Practical discourse
Therapeutic discourse

The performance of the CRCIA against
Webler's evaluation criteria was rated subjectively
by the ®rst author, and subsequently reviewed by the
second author, as described below. The ®rst author's
approach was ®rst to answer as many questions as
possible using the meeting minutes. Next, she asked
questions of Project Management Team members to
verify those answers, to answer the remaining
questions, and to cross-validate interviewees'
answers against one another. Interviewees were
not asked to respond to Webler's question sets
directly; rather, the interviewer asked them general
questions regarding how meetings were conducted.
These responses were then used to answer Webler's
questions as re¯ections of the information conveyed
through the interviews. Since interviewee answers
were consistent with one another and with the
written meeting minutes, we were satis®ed with our
understanding of the CRCIA's procedural elements,
even though only three interviews were conducted.11
Just as analysis of meeting transcripts would
have been preferable to reliance on minutes that
only summarize what transpired at Project
Management Team meetings, so the case could be
made that participant observation would have been
preferable to after-the-fact interviews. Once the
CRCIA process had run to completion, participants
likely formed their own opinions regarding its
successes and failures and their underlying
``causes.'' What they believe now may have been
less apparent to them thenÐa case of ``20/20
hindsight''Ðand may not have been apparent to
the participant-observer either. Strategic behavior is
another potential source of bias, as will become
11

Most of Webler's questions deal with factual issues, as opposed
to matters of opinion, so there is little room for deviation. For
example: Was everyone able to suggest items for the agenda?
Did everyone have equal access to sources for de®nitions of
terms relevant to the discourse? Was there peer review and
independent veri®cation of scienti®c data and knowledge? Was
there an effort to achieve representation of formal interest
group organizations?
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clear in this article's concluding section. In short,
language analysis can be very dif®cult.
The interviewer followed Webler's guidance
with respect to scoring and used plus/minus symbols,
along with a ``degree of interpretation and ¯exibility,'' as he recommends, to signify the CRCIA's
performance against the evaluation criteria. This
process, though highly subjective, resulted in scores
for each individual evaluation criterion.12 If the
answer to a majority of questions in a question set
was yes, that criterion was given a ``+'' score. If few
questions were answered yes, that criterion received
a ``±'' score. In intermediate cases where some of the
questions were answered yes but numerous others
were answered no, that criterion was given an ``s''
score. This scoring system, though ``fuzzy'' in its
evaluation approach, is nevertheless in accord with
that used by Webler and his colleagues. Using the
matrix format developed by Webler, these scores for
individual evaluation criteria were combined to
formulate scores for the paired ``activities'' and
``needs'' subcriteria that relate to each of the two
metacriteria (Tables IV±VII). Thus for each of the
metacriteria fairness and competence there were
two levels of scoring: the overall score for an
evaluation criterion on the basis of answers to
several questions (i.e., a question set), and a score
for a subcriterion that was based on a particular
combination of the evaluation criteria scores developed at the ®rst level.13 The scoring done by the ®rst
author was reviewed by the second author for
agreement. Where evaluations differed, discussion
ensued to resolve differences. The ®nal scores are
tabulated in Tables VI and VII. An example of the
scoring approach is provided in the next section.
3.4. Results
CRCIA's performance with respect to Webler's
evaluation criteria varied widely. Generally, scores
were low for the fairness subcriteria (Table VI) and
somewhat higher for the competence subcriteria
(Table VII). As an illustration of how the ratings
were assigned, consider the following example,
12

Webler(15) argues that subjectivity is inherent in the application
of his framework to case studies.

13

Refer to Chapter 4 and Appendix B of Guglielmo,(27) available
on the Internet at <http://www.sma.washington.edu/people/students/thesis/guglielmo/Index.html> to view the answers to
Webler's question sets, their subsequent scoring, and the path
to the ®nal score tabulations displayed in the text tables.
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Table VI. CRCIA Performance with Respect to Webler's
``Fairness'' Subcriteria*

Agenda and rule making
Moderation and rule
enforcement
Discussion

Attend Initiate Debate

Decide

±
s

±
+

±
±

±
±

±

s

s

±

* Scoring: ``+'' means satis®es most criteria, ``s'' means satis®es
some criteria, ``±'' means satis®es few criteria, and ``+/s'' or
``s/±'' signify marginally positive or negative scores, respectively.
Scores for individual question sets can be found in Guglielmo
(1998), Appendix B.

which explains why the ``Agenda and Rule Making/
Attend'' cell in Table VI was given a ``±'' score.
According to Webler, a fair participatory process provides all participants with an equal chance
to: (1) put their concerns on the agenda and approve
or propose discussion of ground rules (his criterion
A1, which is further elaborated via two subcriteria in
the form of straightforward process-oriented questions);14 (2) debate and critique proposals for the
agenda and rules (criterion A2, elaborated via four
questions); and (3) in¯uence the ®nal decision about
the agenda and rules (criterion A3, elaborated via
two questions). (See also Appendix A of
Guglielmo(27) or Appendix of Webler(15).)
Upcoming agenda items for CRCIA Project
Management Team meetings were discussed among
Team members, although not in a formal, consensually approved, manner. The participants we interviewed felt they had ample opportunity to suggest
items for the agenda. Proposals were not debated,
however, as almost all suggestions were accommodated; DOE was responsible for preparing ®nalized
written copies of the agenda and circulating them to
Team members. Thus only one of the two subcriteria
for A1 is satis®ed. Moreover, the CRCIA performed
Table VII. CRCIA Performance with Respect to Webler's
``Competence'' Subcriteria

Explicative discourse
Theoretical discourse
Practical discourse
Therapeutic discourse

14

Access to
Knowledge

Best Procedures

±
+/s
s/±
s

±
s/±
s/±
+/s

The two questions ask whether all participants have equal
opportunity to suggest items for the agenda and the underlying
rules for discourse, respectively.(15)
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less well with respect to rule making per se. No
explicit discourse or process rules were ever
developed for Management Team meetings. All
participants interviewed felt this was a major weakness of the processÐone that is directly related to
some of the substantive problems the Team
encountered, which are explored more fully below.
Because Webler's framework does not separate
agenda making and rule making for scoring purposes, the relative lack of ability of non-DOE participants to in¯uence rules either for agenda setting or
for subsequent deliberation, even while successful in
having their substantive concerns placed onto the
agenda by the DOE, means that relatively few of the
eight subcriteria associated with criteria A1±A3 are
satis®ed. Hence, we scored the CRCIA's overall
performance with respect to this activities
subcriterion as negative. To our interviewees, the
lack of clear process rules was a negative aspect of
the CRCIA that far outweighed the positive feelings
they had regarding their ability to get items onto the
agenda for discussion. (Chapter 4 and Appendix B
of Guglielmo(27) describes more fully the logic
behind this and other subcriteria scores.)
A lack of attention to process rules clearly
hampered the CRCIA project, an observation that
we believe has implications for the implementation
of models like the analytic-deliberative process
model for achieving consensus over nuclear complex
clean-up decisions. Three major procedural weaknesses made consensus unattainable for the CRCIA
Project Management Team. First, the DOE representative to the Team was not given full support by
his management (i.e., decisions reached by the
Management Team were not necessarily rati®ed by
DOE). As a result, DOE could not fully contribute
to the emergence, through deliberation, of shared
understandings and agreements. Second, no formal
dispute resolution mechanisms were employed during meetings. Decisions were made in a haphazard
fashion and the parties were never able to collectively form a coherent path forward. For instance,
when asked how decisions were made, one interviewee said that generally ``the most stubborn person
won because others gave up in frustration.'' By
contrast, consensus, when viewed through Webler's
model, results from a competent discourse in which
participants reach agreement through rational,
reliable techniques for knowledge selection.
Finally, a lack of attention to comprehensibility
problems resulted in confusion and, often, more
vigorous arguments. Comprehensibility problems
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(i.e., lack of shared or mutually understood meanings for terms, de®nitions, or other concepts) often
provided a quick way to launch a rehash of normative debates over power relations, making the
working environment increasingly adversarial and
clouding substantive issues. As a result, explicative
discourse, theoretically the most straightforward
discourse form, had the only overall negative scores
among the discourse types. The three other types
each satis®ed at least some of Webler's evaluation
criteria.
One such comprehensibility issue arose during a
meeting designed to integrate the CRCIA with
DOE-RL's then emerging Groundwater/Vadose
Zone Integration Project, which occurred after the
Part I and Part II documents had been published.
The YIN representative on the Management Team
used the word ``standard'' to describe speci®cations
for what data should be included in a CRCIA
assessment, and what could be tossed out (i.e.,
assessment standards for time frame, source terms).
The DOE and contractor personnel took ``standard''
to mean regulatory criteria (i.e., a standard for
tritium in drinking water). This misunderstanding
led to a dispute over whether the CRCIA Team had
the legal authority to set standards, while the point
that the YIN representative was trying to
makeÐthat there must be data standards in relation
to developing risk assessment informationÐwent
unaddressed.
Perhaps the most important observation to
come from the evaluation is that all parties to the
discourse were not able to challenge all the validity
claims put forth during discussions. The ability of all
discourse participants to make, challenge, and
defend all four types of validity claims is a central
tenet of Webler's model. Tribal/stakeholder representatives often lacked the technical information to
make or challenge cognitive validity claims, and they
were not provided with the opportunity or means to
acquire such information. By the same token, since
these tribal/stakeholder representatives were invited
to join the Management Team speci®cally so that
their normative claims could be incorporated into
what was viewed as a theoretical exercise, agency
personnel apparently did not feel as if they were in a
position to challenge the normative validity claims
those representatives made. Essentially, some participants favored one type of discourse at the same
time others engaged in a different type. As a result,
two largely unrelated visions of risk emerged from
the Team.
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A striking example of this theoretical-normative
discourse disconnect involves the tribal exposure
scenarios used in the Part I scoping assessment.
Although the DOE's technical representatives believed some of the CTUIR representative's parameter values to be unrealistic, they printed the
scenarios as he presented them. DOE did not
engage tribal representatives in a discourse to
resolve the differing perspectives, they simply
printedÐbut later criticizedÐthe scenarios.
Although the CRCIA did display many features
of the analytic-deliberative approach outlined in
Understanding Risk,(3) its analysis and deliberation
components were not integrated to the extent
recommended by the NRC. The parties interacted
well in the beginning, but their work gradually grew
apart as more and more suggestions were deemed
beyond the scope of Part I and hence relegated to
Part II. The deliberation work (i.e., Part II's effort to
identify what ``should'' be included in a so-called
comprehensive assessment) did not inform or frame
the analysis work (i.e., Part I's scoping assessment).
Of all the ideas generated by the tribal/stakeholder
representatives, only the tribal exposure scenarios
were actually incorporated into the Part I analysis.
Perhaps most basic of all, fundamental differences in views on the nature of risk and the ability of
remediation to reduce risk were not resolved and
apparently not even recognized by the group as a
whole. The authors of Part I had the view that
contaminant levels and risk would be reduced
through time as a result of remediation, while the
authors of Part II continued to maintain that the
highest risks would occur in the future, regardless of
the DOE's best efforts at remediation in the present.
The systematic failure to recognize and reconcile
such differences can at least partially be attributed
to the theoretical-normative discourse disconnect
described above.
4. LESSONS FROM THE CRCIA
After-the-fact procedural evaluation of deliberative processes like the CRCIA can provide important ``micro level'' insights into their strengths and
weaknesses, as this assessment demonstrates. Relatively subtle process breakdowns, such as occurred in
the CRCIA, can be identi®ed via their expressions in
the quality of communicative discourse. Less clear
from such a micro-level perspective, however, is
what strategies, proactively applied, might have led
to a fairer and more competent discourse, and an
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outcome perceived by the participants to have been
more successful. Might, for example, features of the
NRC's analytic-deliberative process not utilized
during the CRCIA have changed the dynamics of
the process to produce a different outcome? Our
consideration of this and related questions leads us
to the observations discussed in this concluding
section. One basic conclusion is that well-applied
analysis-aided deliberation, as typi®ed by the NRC's
analytic-deliberative process model, can improve the
process of exercises like the CRCIA, but not
eliminate the deeper disconnects that in¯uenced
the CRCIA's conduct.
4.1. Re¯ections on the Analytic-Deliberative
Process
On the surface, our procedural evaluation
addresses a rather narrow set of considerations
compared to the objectives set developed by the
NRC committee for its analytic-deliberative process.
From their perspective we have asked only whether
the CRCIA ``got the participation right.''15 Our
results lead us to a somewhat different conclusion
however, one that suggests an ordering of objectives
not apparent in the NRC study.
Where the analytic-deliberative approach is
grounded in ®ve independent objectives, two for the
analysis, two for the deliberation, and one for
synthesis, the lesson of the CRCIA seems to be that
the deliberative objective of ``getting the participation right'' is an important instrumental objective to
both the NRC's objectives for the analysisÐ``getting
the science right'' and ``getting the right science.'' The
debate within the CRCIA over whether the ``right''
science was being employed was resolved via deferral
to Part II of those questions regarded as requiring
scienti®c approaches outside the well-circumscribed
con®nes of current, CERCLA-driven, risk assessment
practice (Table II). The theoretical-normative discourse disconnect that occurred within this debate
expressed itself as an implication, on the part of the
preparers of Part I, that scienti®c approaches whose
protocols were not those of CERCLA-style risk
science were ``wrong'' scienti®c approaches. In the
absence of redemption of such claims, the other
implication was that the legitimacy of the normative
15

The ®ve objectives developed by the NRC committee are:
``getting the science right,'' ``getting the right science,'' ``getting
the right participation,'' ``getting the participation right,'' and
``developing an accurate, balanced and informative synthesis.''(3)
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concerns the science was intended to address was also
suspect.
A second observation concerns what decision
analysts refer to as the ``measurable attributes'' of
the objective of ``getting the participation right.''
Scienti®c norms for ®eld measurements, data analysis, and data quality are offered as the appropriate
means for judging whether the objective of ``getting
the science right'' is being ful®lled in collaborative
risk assessments in the NRC's Understanding Risk.
This study suggests that the framework developed
by Webler and utilized in our analysis of the CRCIA
can play a similar function in the qualitative assessment of the fairness and competence (i.e., ``rightness'') of the deliberative aspects of these same
expert-public collaborations. Just as the practice of
natural science has spawned protocols for judging
the quality of scienti®c enterprise, so social scientists
can develop protocols for judging the quality of
deliberation.(28)
Our ®nal comment on the analytic-deliberative
process is both broader and more cautionary. Our
results lead us to ask whether ®xing the details of
deliberative process, from whatever perspective, can
suf®ce to improve the mutuality of risk characterization when prior history and present political
context also frame the deliberation that attempts
to address risk in a collaborative way. We take this
question up in our next, and concluding, section.
4.2. Importance of Macro-Level Context to
Interpreting the Lessons of Micro-Level
Analysis
The CRCIA neither emerged at Hanford as a de
novo activity, nor, over its year-and-a-half life, did it
exist in a vacuum. As a consequence, it is not easily
classi®ed via the NRC Committee's vision of the
``Risk Decision Landscape'' (p. 137 ff.).(3) The
CRCIA had a past, a present, and a future, and
understanding the earlier evolutions that led to and
framed it, the dynamics that changed it as it evolved,
and the effect its coming and going has had on other,
ongoing deliberations regarding the Hanford cleanup is vital to assessing its ultimate impact. Broad
contextual factors outside the CRCIA itself de®ned
and in¯uenced the interactions among participating
parties, affecting outcomes at every stage.
The relevance of such factors is dif®cult to
assess both from the NRC's perspective and from
that of participatory analysis. Macro-scale features
of models like Laird's pluralism model of demo-
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cratic process, and contextual factors like those
pointed to by Jasanoff, can both help frame
understanding. As Jasanoff put it in her 1993
guest editorial in this journal:
How people interpret a given set of facts about risk
may depend on a host of variables, such as their
institutional af®liations, their trust in the information
provider, their prior experience with similar risk
situations, and their power to in¯uence the source of
the risk. (p. 127)(5)

4.2.1. The Past: Power Relations
To the extent that the CRCIA was a negotiation, it was negotiation among parties of inherently
unequal power. The tribes and other participants
had virtually no ability through the CRCIA to get
the DOE to adopt risk management measures it was
not willing to adopt voluntarily. Beyond that, the
situation of power relationships among CRCIA
participants was extraordinarily complex.
The tribes of the Hanford region do not
participate except informally on the Hanford Advisory Board (HAB), the principal mechanism for
citizen input to DOE decisions regarding Hanford.
This is in accord with their position that, as treaty
tribes, they are sovereigns whose appropriate role
vis aÁ vis DOE is that of government-to-government
consultation. With the CRCIA, however, the visibility of tribal representatives relative to that of the
stakeholder communities represented on the HAB
was reversed somewhat from the usual. The tribes
played a prominent role while the roles of the HAB,
and of state and federal regulatory agency co-signers
of the Hanford Triparty Agreement, were somewhat
diminished.
When a debate is structured in technical terms, as
is any risk analysis by de®nition, citizens who are not
technical specialists have less to contribute; the
debate becomes dominated by the institutions that
can afford the necessary expertise.(14) In the CRCIA
case, this turned out to be the tribes, who had
relatively better access to technical expertise than
other stakeholder participants, a result of the fact that
the DOE provides ®nancial resources to tribes and
other organized interests intended to enhance their
ability to engage in technical debate. Even the
CRCIA's Part II restricted its de®nition of risk to a
quantity that can be measured. This is still a form of
technocracy, despite the fact that the process that
created Part II was open to nonspecialists. The social
and cultural content is there, but it is still framed in
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technical terms. Given the basic terms of reference
under which the CRCIA was created, by insisting on
quanti®cation, the tribes were maximizing their
chances of in¯uencing DOE, the most important of
the other social participants. This is not necessarily
the same as reaching shared understanding through
risk characterization.
The CRCIA thus seems to have become at least
in part a mechanism for the tribes to use in trying to
equilibrate the historic power imbalance vis aÁ vis
DOE. The Yakama Tribe in particular regards the
portions of the Hanford Reservation they ceded as
their land and wants to participate in managing site
risks, even though the DOE does not acknowledge
sovereignty to the extent the tribes feel is appropriate. The CRCIA was thus a means to increase tribal
authority over the assessment phase. Unable to
in¯uence the output of DOE risk decision processes
as much as they would have liked, it appears that the
tribes hoped to gain more control over the input
through the CRCIA, where the prospects were
relatively good that the DOE could be persuaded
to look at risks at least in part from a tribal
perspective (Section 2.2). As Edelman(29) suggests,
using the jargon of an administrative agency (in this
case, the language of risk assessment) can be a
powerful way of expressing belonging.
4.2.2. The Present as Prologue to the Future:
A Changing Decision Problem in a
Dynamic Context
The NRC Committee attempted to classify the
appropriateness of risk decision situations to the
analytic-deliberative process in terms of a classic,
decision-analytic typology of decision types. The
CRCIA never ®t any of the typical decision types
very well however, and as it evolved it grew less and
less coupled to any decision at all. As has been
observed in numerous studies of bargaining in
practice, such ``fuzzing up'' of the ultimate objective
can work much to the advantage of completing the
task at hand while the job of resolving the really
tough issues is shelved.(30) The battle can be won,
while the war is not necessarily lost. Such, seemingly,
was the case with the CRCIA.
The CRCIA was originally intended to inform
decisions about what additional CERCLA remedial
actions were necessary at Hanford. What was
already an ambiguous situation, with numerous
contested remedial action proposals under debate,
became more ambiguous as the CRCIA moved
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away from this initial vision. Soon it was being seen
by participants as a one-time chance to forge a
template for future remediation decisions, with
broad implications for what the extent of its reach
might ultimately prove to be. The CRCIA was able
to proceed because entanglement with preexisting
stalemates over future land use and associated cleanup levels in particular portions of the Hanford Site
could be avoided. But the cost was that commitment
to the risk characterization principles that emerged
could prove very costly to the DOE.
Although the DOE distanced itself from the
CRCIA at its end, continued interaction with stakeholders at the site since then has led to resurfacing of
the principles and purposes the CRCIA embodied.
The periodic emergence of new angles and dimensions of the Hanford clean-up problem tends to
bring the same participants together over and over
again in an evolving situation that bears the imprint
of past interaction. Most recently, the con®rmation
that contaminants from tank farm operations in the
Hanford Site's central plateau have reached groundwater has renewed interest in the kind of broad
assessment of risks to the Columbia River that led to
the CRCIA, this time in the guise of the Groundwater/Vadose Zone Integration Project.
Jasanoff(5) has suggested that inadequate
attention to the qualitative factors of ``scale''
(spatial, temporal, and cross-cultural), ``interactivity'' (production of risk through interplay of
nature and society), and ``contingency'' (context
dependency of risk knowledge) increases the
likelihood of expert-expert and expert-public disagreement. The lessons of the CRCIA reinforce
and amplify this notion. The decision to deal with
scale differences by ``binning'' risk items into Part
I vs. Part II, depending on implied scale of effect,
did not serve to redress the fundamental disconnect these different visions of relevant risk represented. The explicit factors of scale that drove this
sorting of risks were temporal and spatial, but the
implicit factors were cultural.
That the risks the presence of radioactive
contaminants at Hanford represent were created
by the DOE's antecedent agencies, and in the view
of some made worse by DOE inaction or inattention, are also factors that appear not to be separable
from the process of participatory risk assessment at
Hanford. Whether intentionally or not, the CRCIA
Part II framework serves to underscore the reprehensible nature of the government's past actions at
Hanford. By the nature of its design, the assessments

Analytic-Deliberative Process at Hanford
its risk models would produce would generate moral
outrage, thereby creating an imperative for action.
The suggestion is that selecting the ``right'' science
will not be a straightforward task if participants view
``right'' science as that which produces culpability.
When participants are separated by different ideological and moral stances, and these stances are
strongly linked to the positions they take on policy
questions, neither science nor deliberation may be
able to do much to produce an outcome mutually
satisfactory to all participants.(31)16 Reconnecting the
technical minutiae of risk assessment with the larger
vision of risk remains a major challenge.(5)
When the problem is theoretical-normative disconnect, as we interpret it to have been in the CRCIA,
technical assistance that enables all representatives to
challenge the theoretical claims made by others could
help. From a slightly different perspective, much
might be gained by self-conscious attention to conceptual aspects of group process design, such as
through professional facilitation.(32) Facilitation was
attempted early on in the CRCIA process, though
soon rejected as ineffective. Also useful would be the
presence, on the project management team, of a
variety of viewpoints both able and willing to
contribute to a robust normative debate. In retrospect, the CRCIA provided none of these. In the
broader scheme of things, however, this assessment
suggests that isolated exercises in participatory risk
assessment, no matter how well conducted, will not
serve to untangle the knots into which perceptions of
risk, justice, and the meaning of history are presently
tied at many of the nation's legacy nuclear sites.
By contrast, the de®ciencies we have identi®ed
come from a parsing of the most basic building
blocks of societal debate about riskÐlanguage
itself. The premise of the micro-level analysis we
conducted is that it is suf®cient to compare the
discourse that took place with an idealized situation, which Habermas himself acknowledges is
unlikely to be realized in real-world debate. Thus,
nearly every participatory process will be found
de®cient in some way by this standard, even those
judged by participants to have come to much more
favorable conclusions than was the CRCIA. Put
16

Strictly speaking, discourse analysis does not provide a basis for
judging the success of outcomes, focusing as it does on the
quality of participation. The implication is that better participation leads to improved understanding, as noted in Section 1.
Individual satisfaction with outcome is a participant-focused
measure that was clearly of great importance to our interviewees, who were not satis®ed with the outcome of the CRCIA.
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another way, pointing to theoretical-normative
disconnect as a problem is not the same thing as
dooming the process itself to failure. Nor can
``getting the participation right'' be considered a
formula for success, particularly for problems that
have histories and social and political contexts like
that of the Hanford cleanup. Moreover, we can
imagine a great many contexts in which scientists
and technical specialists would feel compelled to
``bin'' things they feel well equipped to deal with
(e.g., the CRCIA's Part I) differently from items
where they feel less secure as to methodological
approach (e.g., the CRCIA's Part II)Ðit's part of
the training. While many things no doubt contributed to the muddled outcome of the CRCIA, our
broader point is that the considerations one is led
to by discourse analysis appear to be valuable aids
to putting the analytic-deliberative process into
practice.
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